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Abstract: This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid
repeated auction with the right of ﬁrst refusal using two bidders and asymmetric in-
formation regarding the bidders’ value distributions. When contract value is constant
from one auction to the next and winners’ values are publicized, agents retain the
value of incumbency and bids are identical to one-shot auctions. When each agents’
contract values are random across auctions, agents choose to bid away the full ex-
pected value of incumbency, providing a measure of the value of information in this
context.
1 Introduction
The right of ﬁrst refusal exists in many types of contracts that can be thought of as
repeated auctions. Undeveloped land, residential property, and commercial property
contracts all may include the right of ﬁrst refusal to provide current tenants the option
to retain the contract to the property. Securities sales by owners often allow other
owners the right of ﬁrst refusal in order to control ownership. Employment contracts,
especially those of athletes and entertainers may empower the current employer with
the right of ﬁrst refusal as encouragement to support those unproven talents early
in their careers. Various types of investment settings provide investors the right
of ﬁrst refusal on the developed innovation as an incentive to invest in research.
Often, procurement contracts such as those for municipal garbage collection or cable
television service, include the right of ﬁrst refusal. Some National Parks concession
contracts also include the right of ﬁrst refusal.
A repeated auction is deﬁned in this article to be an inﬁnite series of auctions
used to award the same, indivisible object in each period. Some repeated auctions
incorporate the right of ﬁrst refusal (rofr), where the incumbent has the opportunity
to continue to hold the right to the awarded object by matching the best bid of any
1entering bidder in each period. We provide a general analysis of initial period, entrant
and incumbent bidder behavior. Additionally, we derive the equilibrium bids when
contract values are constant over time and made common knowledge, and in the case
where values are stochastic across auctions.
Repeated auctions have been studied since Demsetz (1968) called for the use of
franchise bidding to award monopoly contracts. The treatment of and assumptions
concerning the incumbent aﬀects the outcome of the repeated auction. The impor-
tance of the incumbent is seen in Osmundsen (1996) when repeated auctions are
applied to nonrenewable resource extraction franchises, and in Laﬀont and Tirole
(1998) as incumbent’s make investment choices in the ﬁrst period. Here, the speciﬁcs
of the incumbent may represent actual auctions, and allow the characterization of an
equilibrium.
Repeated auctions are often assumed to include the same bidders in each period,
and numerous articles therefore examine collusion among repeat bidders as an impor-
tant aspect of the repeated auction process (Phillips et al. 2003, Fabra 2003, Aoyagi
2003, Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn 2004). However, the length of the awarded contracts
or the characteristics of the object make the assumption of a changing pool of entrant
bidders more realistic. In this work, the entrant bidders are therefore allowed to vary
across periods.
This article is the ﬁrst to model the equilibria in ﬁrst price repeated auctions with
the right of ﬁrst refusal. Others have considered the right of ﬁrst refusal in other con-
texts. Walker (1999) argues that the right of ﬁrst refusal protects against bargaining
breakdown and inhibits exit from a market, but it also may limit competitive bidding.
In the ﬁrst economic analysis of the right of ﬁrst refusal, Kahan (1999) models the
value of the right of ﬁrst refusal in negotiated contracts (not auctions), and shows
that the value of the right will depend on the relative valuations of the good. Addi-
2tional theory and an experimental examination of the right of ﬁrst refusal is presented
in Grosskopf and Roth (2004), who conclude that the speciﬁc characteristics of the
right of ﬁrst refusal can work to the advantage or disadvantage of the right holder.
Bikhchandani et al. (2005) discuss the impacts of the right of ﬁrst refusal on the seller
and potential buyers, and conclude that the right is ineﬃcient (the bidder with the
highest value does not necessarily win), and the seller may forego surplus relative
to auctions without the right of ﬁrst refusal. Finally, Chouinard (2005) compares
one-shot ﬁrst-price auctions with and without the right of ﬁrst refusal in the context
of U.S. National Parks concession contracts.
Building on Bikhchandani et al. (2005) and Chouinard (2005), equilibria of ﬁrst
price repeated auctions with the right of ﬁrst refusal are modelled. Two bidders per
round are considered, each with uniform value functions. Initially, it is assumed that
the contract value is constant over time for each agent, and the winners’ values are
publicly revealed. The model is then extended to consider a case in which private
contract value is stochastic across agents and across time for each agent, such that
the incumbent’s assessment of the value of the next contract is known publicly, and
the value of future contracts are not known with certainty by any agent.
These informational diﬀerences lead to diﬀerent bidding strategies for both the
initial auction and all subsequent auctions. With constant contract values for each
agent, the ﬁrst-round bid is a standard ﬁrst-price one-shot auction strategy: agents
will bid one half of their contract valuation, such that the winner retains half of the
current contract value plus the expected value of incumbency, and the agent with the
highest valuation wins. With temporally stochastic contract value, ﬁrst-round agents
bid one half the current contract value plus the entire expected value of incumbency.
After the initial round, entrants with temporally constant contract value will bid
only if their contract value is larger than the known value of the incumbent. With
3temporally stochastic contract value, an entrant will bid one half their current contract
value plus at least half of the value of incumbency in an attempt to beat the right of
ﬁrst refusal held by the incumbent.
2 General ROFR auction environment
In each period there are two bidders, and although the number of agents is restricted
to two per round, agents may hold diﬀerent contract valuations in diﬀerent rounds.1
At the beginning of each period, the seller oﬀers for bid a monopoly right for one
period. The largest bid wins the monopoly right for that period. The winner transfers
her bid amount to the seller, and retains the value of the monopoly right for that
period.
In the ﬁrst auction, agents submit bids simultaneously.2 This initial round amounts
to a symmetric private value auction. In each subsequent round, the entrant submits
a bid ﬁrst. The incumbent learns the entrant’s bid, and then matches the entrant’s
bid if and only if the incumbent’s expected value of winning exceeds the entrant’s bid.
If the incumbent fails to submit a matching bid to secure the contract, the entrant
receives the contract and the incumbency until she is outbid by a new entrant in some
future round. We assume for simplicity that an ex-incumbent never again enters the
auction series after losing an incumbency.
Contract value for each agent is independently drawn from a standard uniform
distribution, and this fact is common knowledge among agents. The actual value
of a contract in any given period is private knowledge until and unless this value
is revealed through the auction process, and no collusion of any form exists among
1This can be interpreted in two ways: bidders may change from period to period, or bidders draw
new valuations in each period. More on this later.
2If two bidders submit identical bids in the initial auction, a winner will be selected randomly.
4bidders. The payoﬀ function can be characterized as the present value of the initial
contract plus the expected value of future contracts as an incumbent, for agent i in




























are bids and values for agents 1 and 2 in
time t. E[UI
t+1] is the expected value of being the incumbent beginning in period
t+1, and δ is the discount factor such that δE[UI
t+1] is the expected present value of
incumbency.
Incumbents have the right of ﬁrst refusal and therefore bid in response to an en-
trant’s bid. This bid pattern means that the value of incumbency depends crucially
on entrant bids. Below we characterize the incumbent’s problem, the entrant’s prob-
lem, and the initial-period problem in general terms. In the next section we develop
optimal bid functions for more speciﬁc assumptions about how contract value changes
over time.
2.1 Incumbent’s bid in response to an entrant.
The incumbent’s expected net present value of the auction series evaluated at time t,
with privately known vI
t and entrant bid bE
t is the sum of this period’s net earnings
plus the discounted expected present value of incumbency. Applying Bayes’ theorem,
5this value can be written as
E[U
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where δ is the discount rate, E[UI
t+1] is the expected value of incumbency for t+1
onward, and vI
t is known when the entrant’s bid bE
t is oﬀered. Given an entrant’s bid,













The optimal bid of an entrant facing a current incumbent and the expected value of
future incumbency will be derived next.
2.2 Entrant’s bid against an incumbent.
The expected value to the entrant of bidding against an incumbent is the net value of
the ﬁrst period’s earnings plus the discounted present value of the incumbency that
the entrant might win, times the probability of winning the incumbency. An entrant
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6where the entrant’s bid bE










































Information about future periods is constant across all future periods such that
E[UI
t+1] = E[UI













t+1] depends in part on assumptions about the characteristics
of future contract values vi
t, and Pr[UI
t+1 > bE
t+1] is the probability that an incumbent
























t+2], the right-hand-side of equation 6 can be substituted into
equation 7 and solved for Pr[UI
t+1 > bE
t+1].
To more completely characterize equations 4 through 7 and to derive the optimal
bid function, we must impose a precise speciﬁcation of the stochastic nature of vi
t.
This will be done in section 3.
72.3 First round bidding.
Bidder i’s expected payoﬀ of winning the initial auction is similar to an entrant trying
to outbid an incumbent, but in this case each agent is on equal footing. Each agent
bids without knowledge of the other agent’s ﬁrst period bid or contract valuation. As
before, the probability of an agent winning is equal to the probability that an agent’s
bid is higher than the other agent’s bid. Because agents are identical, we can infer
that their bid functions will be symmetric, and an agent’s bid need not be larger than
the other agent’s valuation of a win (as is the case with an entrant challenging an




















0], i 6= j. (8)
The following discussion will focus on agent 1’s perspective, so that b1
0 is the choice
variable, and b2
0 is unknown from agent 1’s perspective. Let vi
t = v1
0 be the value draw
for agent i = 1 at t = 0, and bi
0 and b
j
0 are agent i = 1 and agent j = 2 ﬁrst round
bids, respectively. The probability of agent 1 winning is Pr[b2
0 < b1
0].
To reduce notational clutter, let ˜ vi
0 = vi
0 +δE[Ui
1], such that agent i’s optimal bid
is a function of ˜ vi
0: ˜ bi
0 = ˜ bi
0(˜ vi




0]. Now deﬁne ˜ σ(˜ bi
0) as the inverse function of ˜ bi(˜ vi
0) such that ˜ σ(˜ bi
0(˜ vi
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The optimal bid functions for the entrant based on equation 4 and the optimal bid
function for ﬁrst-period bidders based on equation 10 depend on the stochastic char-
acteristics of vi
t. The next section builds upon this foundation to identify optimal bid
functions under two diﬀerent informational scenarios.
3 Special cases
The two scenarios examined below diﬀer only in how contract values for a given agent
change over time. Assume for both cases that contract value vi
t is drawn independently
across across agents from a standard uniform distribution, such that the PDF and
CDF of vi
t are f(vi
t) = 1 and F(vi
t) = vi
t, respectively. This is a common distributional
assumption in the auction literature.
In the ﬁrst scenario, each agent draws a contract value prior to the initial period
and retains this value for all subsequent auctions. In the second scenario, each agent
draws a new contract value prior to bidding on each successive auction. This change in
assumption leads to substantially diﬀerent bidding strategies and buyer/seller welfare
distribution.
3.1 Contract value constant over time
In this scenario, each agent independently draws vi
t = vi prior to the ﬁrst round auc-
tion from a standard uniform distribution (with support [0,1]). This value is constant
9over time for each agent, although incumbents need not face the same challenger (en-
trant) in subsequent periods. The value of the winner is made common knowledge.
This is similar to Vickrey (1961), where it is assumed one bidder knows the valuation
of the other. Landsberger et al. (2001) evaluate ﬁrst price auctions given the ranking
of bidder valuations is known. They suggest that knowledge about incumbent’s values
may also come from previous auction experience, access to other’s ﬁnancial resources,
or other idiosyncratic features of bidders. In the types of auctions considered here,
it is reasonable that entrant bidders may be able to observe the incumbent, as one
period of the repeated auction may last several years. This may allow entrants to
discover the incumbent’s contract value even if winning bid values are hidden.
One practical implication of this information structure is that an entrant bidding
against an incumbent will not submit a meaningful bid unless she will win the con-
tract. Without further contractual rules, having no challenging bid would allow the
incumbent to renew her contract with some arbitrarily small bid and extract virtu-
ally all rents from the seller. It is therefore assumed that the seller will not accept a
bid from an incumbent lower than the bid with which she ﬁrst won the contract. In
this setting, entrant and incumbent bids are relatively straightforward, and will be
formally characterized after deriving the bid functions for the initial auction.
3.1.1 Initial period bids
To maximize the objective function characterized by equation 10 for the current envi-
ronment, the probability of i outbidding j (Pr[b
j
0 < bi
0]) and the discounted expected
value of being the incumbent (E[UI
t ]) must be determined.
First consider the expected value of incumbency E[UI
1] as characterized in general
form in equation 5. In this environment, an incumbent’s bids will be constant for
the duration of her tenure because a) an entrant will bid only if she will win, and b)
10incumbents must bid at least their initial bid but have no incentive to bid more than
their initial bid. It follows that for each period, an incumbent will receive vI − bI.
The probability of an incumbent winning one (additional) auction is the proba-
bility that her expected value of incumbency is greater than that of a challenging
entrant. Because contract value and an incumbent’s bids are constant over time, the
incumbent’s value of future incumbency is at least as large as an entrant’s value of fu-
ture incumbency iﬀ vE ≤ vI. Given known vI and a standard uniform distribution for
vE, the probability that an incumbent wins in any given period is Pr[vE < vI] = vI.































1 − δvI . (11)
Substituting the right-hand-side of equation 11 into the initial bidder’s problem (equa-






























2 < ˜ σ(b
1)]. (12)
In this case, Pr(˜ v2 < ˜ σ(b1)) can be simpliﬁed. Contract values are constant across
time and ˜ v1 > ˜ v2 iﬀ v1 > v2, so Pr[˜ v2 > ˜ v1] = Pr[v2 > v1]. We can therefore replace
11Pr[˜ v2 < ˜ σ(b1)] with Pr[v2 < σ(b1)], where σ(b1) is an inverse function analogous to
˜ σ(b1). Given that v2 is uniformly distributed,
Pr(b2(v2) < b






Further, note that because the expected value of incumbency is a function of vI,






















v1 − b1. (15)






Solving this diﬀerential equation yields σ(b1) = 2b1 and σ0(b1) = 2.3 Because σ(b1) =






3To solve this diﬀerential equation, let y(b1) = σ(b1) − b1, so that σ(b1) = y(b1) + b1 and
σ0(b1) = y0(b1)+1. Substituting for σ and σ0 yields y0(b1)∗y(b1) = b1. The solution to this equation








2 . Only using the positive solution gives
y(b1) = b1. Given σ(b1) = y(b1) + b1, substituting for y(b1) yields σ(b1) = 2b1.
12In this initial auction the two bidders are symmetric, so each bidder i will bid
bi =
vi
2 and the highest value will win the auction in the ﬁrst period.4 Because v1 is
the gross value of the ﬁrst-period contract, the result indicates that the winner retains
one half of the ﬁrst-period contract value and the entire present value of incumbency.
Interestingly, this result is identical to a one-shot ﬁrst-price auction.
3.1.2 Entrant and incumbent bidding strategies
For subsequent rounds given this environment, the entrant and incumbent bids are
relatively straightforward. From the entrant’s perspective, Pr[E[UI
t ] < bE
t ] in equa-
tion 4 is either zero or one. Equation 12 implies that the value of winning an auction
(conditional on winning it) is vi−bi
1−δvi. This value is nonpositive if bi ≥ vi. An incum-
bent will match an entrant’s bid only if vI ≥ bE, and an entrant will therefore bid






∅ if vE ≤ vI
vI + ε if vE > vI.
If no entrant bids, the incumbent submits her previous bid as required by the seller,
but an entrant will bid only if she knows she can win. Therefore, the incumbent’s
initial bid of bi = vi
2 will stand for each period until an entrant with a higher contract
value enters the auction.
4Chouinard (2006) considers two generalizations of this case: ﬁrst, N bidders are allowed, and
second, the cumulative distribution function for vi is generalized to F = va for v ∈ (0,1). These
generalization complicates the analytics somewhat, but the results are similar to the ones presented
in this article. or example, for N bidders, the optimal initial bid is bi = vi(N − 1)/N. For the
generalized distribution, the optimal bid is bi = via/(a + 1).
133.2 Uncertain future contract value
Now, we allow contract value to diﬀer over time for each agent. At the beginning of
each period, individuals privately draw vi
t from independent and identical standard
uniform distributions, and then submit a bid.5 Thus, each agent knows their own
current contract value at bidding time, but have symmetric information about future
period values. A fundamental diﬀerence in this scenario is that the value of future
incumbency is independent of any agent’s current bid.
The expected value of being an incumbent is ﬁrst derived below, followed by the
objective function and the bid function of an entrant, which is more complicated than
in the previous scenario. The bid function for initial bidders is derived last.
3.2.1 The value of incumbency and the entrant’s bid
The general form of the entrant’s problem (equation 4) depends on the expected
value of incumbency (equation 6). The expected value of incumbency is based on
the expected value E[vI] and the entrant’s optimal bid, for future periods, and the
probability of retaining the incumbency in future periods. Given this setting, E[vI
t+1−
bE
t+1] = E[vI] − bE(E[v]), and with standard uniform distributions for all vi
t, E[v] = 
0.5 0.5

for all t. Because expectations about future periods are constant over time,
the time index and expectation operator in equation 6 will be dropped and replaced
with an overbar, so ¯ UI ≡ E[UI
t+i] represent the expected value of incumbency (given
incumbency), and ¯ P I ≡ Pr[¯ UI > ¯ bE] represents the probability of an incumbent
winning again in future periods. Remembering that ¯ bE is a choice variable evaluated
5These can be thought of as predictions for period t contract value upon which agents base their
bids.






1 − δ ¯ P I . (17)
It also follows from equation 7 that the probability of the incumbent winning in future
periods is 6
¯ P
I = 1 − (2¯ b




1 − 2¯ bE
1 − δ ¯ UI (18)
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. (19)


































t − δ ¯ U
I ¯ P
I, (21)
6The probability in equation 18 can be written as an inﬁnite sum of present expected values:
¯ PI = (1 − 2¯ bE)
P∞
i=0(δ ¯ UI)i. Also, Pr[¯ UI < ¯ bE] = 2¯ b
E−δ ¯ U
I
1−δ ¯ UI .
7There are actually two solutions, because equation 17 is quadratic in ¯ UI after the substitution
of equation 18. The only economically meaningful solution is that which is a declining function of
¯ bE, because the expected value of incumbency must decline as the expected entrant bid increases.
15with ¯ UI and ¯ P I deﬁned by equations 19 and 18 above. Notice that equation 20 is
a function of two potentially diﬀerent entrant bids: an entrant bid for period t and the
expected entrant bid for future periods. To solve for these entrant bids, we maximize
equation 20 twice: once to derive the expected future bid ¯ bE, and a second time to
derive bE
t conditional on ¯ bE. To derive ¯ bE, we maximize equation 20 conditional on
vE
t = E[vE
t ] = 0.5 and the restriction that bE
t = ¯ bE. After all the relevant substitutions
from above, equation 20 is a complicated function of parameters δ, µ = 0.5, and the
choice variable ¯ bE. Maximizing this function provides the optimal entrant bid ¯ bE.8
The optimal ¯ bE is then substituted into equations 18 and 19, which allows calcu-
lation of a scalar value for the expected present value of incumbency, δ ¯ UI ¯ P I. This
scalar value is substituted into the entrant’s objective function (20), which is max-
imized (again) for the optimal period t bid, bE
t . With a scalar value for δ ¯ UI ¯ P I in
hand, equation 20 is quadratic in bE
t . The ﬁrst-order condition is
∂E[UE
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Equation 22 shows that the entrant will bid away one half of the current period’s
contract value plus a fraction (between one-half and three-quarters) of the expected
value of incumbency, depending on ¯ P I. Figure 1 shows the expected value of incum-
bency as a function of expected entrant bids. As the expected entrant bid increases,
the expected value of incumbency declines. Notice also that there is no analogous
8Mathematica c 
code and results are available from the authors upon request.
16Figure 1: Expected value of future
incumbency (eq. 19).
Figure 2: Entrant contract value
as a function of bE
t (eq. 22)
continuous entrant bid function for the case in which agents have static contract val-
ues: in that case, entrants either bid if the value of their incumbency outweighs the
incumbent’s value, or they do not bid at all.
Figure 2 shows the expected value of a contract from the entrant’s perspective
(with known vE
t ), as a function of the entrant’s bid. Both ﬁgures are based on
δ = 1/1.05 and vE
t = E[vE
t ] = 0.5. Given these values, the expected entrant bid in
future periods is 0.328; the discounted expected value of incumbency (δ ¯ UI) is 0.31;
¯ P I is 0.497; the optimal entrant bid is 0.44, and the expected value of an entrant’s
optimal bid given current contract value of vE
t = 0.5 is 0.269.
3.2.2 First-round bidding
Given that E[UI
t+i] = ¯ UI for all i > 0 and the uniform distribution of vi
t, the objective
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As a reminder, ˜ vi
0 = vi
0 + δ ¯ UI, so this ﬁrst order condition is diﬀerent than the
analogous equation 15 by the presence of the constant δ ¯ UI in two places. A non-





0 − 3δ ¯ U
I.9 (25)
Finally, because of symmetry among agents, Pr[v2




implying that ˜ σ(b1
0) = v1
0 + δ ¯ UI. Substituting the right hand side of equation 25 for
˜ σ(b1







+ δ ¯ U
I. (26)
Thus, in the ﬁrst round, agent’s bid (and therefore the seller receives) all of the
expected value of incumbency and one half of the current contact value. This result
is in contrast to the previous case in which only one half of the value of the current
contract is bid, and the winning bidder retains the full value of incumbency.
4 Conclusion
This article examines repeated auctions with the right of ﬁrst refusal. A general
form of the problem is ﬁrst presented, and then optimal bid functions for ﬁrst-period
9This solution corresponds to a constant of integration equal to zero and boundary condition
˜ σ(c) − δ ¯ UI = 0, where c is an arbitrary constant. This condition corresponds to a constant of
integration equal to zero. No other non-empty solutions were found for economically reasonable
boundary conditions given the current problem.
18bidders, entrants, and incumbents are derived for two diﬀerent cases. The ﬁrst case
assumes that contract values diﬀer across agents but not over time, and the second
case assumes that contract value is stochastic across agents and over time for each
agent. Although this diﬀerence in assumptions may at ﬁrst glance appear innocuous,
it requires substantially diﬀerent solution approaches; especially to derive the optimal
bids of entrants challenging an incumbent.
These two cases also highlight the value of information and its distributional
eﬀects. When agents know their private contract values into the future and the
incumbents value of the contract, initial bidders choose to bid only one half of their
initial period contract value, so if they win, they retain one half of the ﬁrst period’s
contract value plus the entire expected value of incumbency beyond that. In contrast,
when an agent’s future valuations are stochastic such that all agents know each agent’s
distribution, each agent knows their value prior to the current auction, but no one
knows their future contract values, then initial bidders bid away the entire value
of future incumbency in addition to half of the ﬁrst-period value. Thus, sellers are
better oﬀ (and initial bidders are worse oﬀ) when agents do not know the incumbent’s
contract value.
When entrants know the incumbent’s contract value, incumbents are unseated
only by agents with higher contract values, but otherwise retain their initial bid of
one-half of their contract value. In contrast, entrant’s facing temporally stochastic
contract values bid a fraction (between 1/2 and 3/4) of their net present value of win-
ning in hopes that this bid will be higher than the net present value of the incumbent
for that period.
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